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Rhetoric and Reality in the
ABA Standards
Linda L. Berger
Language creates the reality it describes.1
—Desmond Tutu, Excerpt from Bill Moyers’ Conversation with Archbishop Tutu, Apr. 27, 
1999, PBS (Dec. 28, 2007)
The language of the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards governing 
the approval of law schools refl ects and creates “how things are” in legal 
education. Looking at the language of the ABA Standards on faculty and 
curricula, it’s clear that the Standards refl ect and create hierarchy. Nothing 
demonstrates this as well as the former Interpretation 402-1, which declared 
that only a tenure-track faculty member would count as “one” full faculty 
member while “additional teaching resources” would be counted as “less than 
one.”2
What set of beliefs and values could justify explicit subordination of some 
categories of law school professors based on the subject matter of their courses 
or the method of their teaching? For that matter, what beliefs and values could 
justify the implicit devaluation found elsewhere in the Standards of clinical and 
legal writing courses? Nowhere in the Standards or their legislative history are 
these beliefs and values set forth. They appear to go without saying, rationales 
unstated, assumptions unexplained.
Equally clear from rhetorical analysis of the language of the Standards 
is that they refl ect and reinforce a set of ideological commitments. As an 
example, let’s focus on the Standards’ confl uence with neoliberal philosophy. 
1. Desmond Tutu, Excerpt from Bill Moyers’ Conversation with Archbishop Tutu, Apr. 27, 1999, PBS (Dec. 
28, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/12282007/transcript2.html [https://perma.
cc/BV79-CQEE].
2. Some legal writing and clinical professors benefi ted from the interpretation because 
it encouraged law schools to put these professors on the tenure track so they could 
be counted as “one.” The provision was removed in 2014. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of 
Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Explanation of Changes from 2014 Comprehensive 
Review of the Standards, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_
resolutions/201408_explanation_changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJL6-NE57].
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In the neoliberal view, the meritorious rise to the top. Those at the top are 
by defi nition deserving, and no further explanation or justifi cation need be 
off ered. If, on the other hand, individuals or groups occupy a lower rung, or 
could be considered outsiders or outliers, even well-documented arguments 
may be insuffi  cient to justify their worth.3
If we confronted similar circumstances outside the law school setting, 
we would critique the resulting regulatory system. Based on largely hidden 
and therefore unexamined assumptions, it makes subordination natural and 
inevitable. Faced with similar conclusions elsewhere, we would demand full 
protections and equal rights for those in the resulting marginalized categories. 
As law professors committed to equal justice and full citizenship throughout 
society, we have an obligation to do no less at home. Timely amendment of the 
ABA Standards appears unlikely. As a result, the policy statement published 
in this issue of the Journal of Legal Education and setting forth “best practices” 
for protecting the rights of those with Standard 405(c) status4 provides one 
of our most powerful options, serving as an essential bridge for individual 
law faculties and law schools motivated to equalize protections and rights 
themselves.
This brief rhetorical analysis grows out of the work of Sonja Foss and other 
contemporary rhetoricians who sought to uncover ideological commitments 
through analysis of rhetorical structures, strategies, and language uses. As 
Foss notes, to remain dominant, governing ideological commitments “must 
be constructed, renewed, reinforced, and defended continually through the 
use of rhetorical strategies and practices.”5 When the project is successful, the 
“dominant ideology controls what participants see as natural or obvious by 
establishing the norm. . . . [and] provides a sense that things are the way they 
have to be as it asserts that its meanings are the real, natural ones.”6
How do the ABA Standards accomplish this? The Standards combine 
the rhetorical structure of hierarchical categories (dividing law faculty and 
curricula along subject matter lines, which results in analogous divisions along 
the lines of teaching methods) with the rhetorical strategy of assuming the 
conclusion (supporting the privileges accorded to what everyone already knows, 
no explanation needed) and supporting language choices (establishing 
traditional prototypes of faculty and “substantive” law and labeling everybody and 
3. See, e.g., Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 4, 2014, at 71 (2015) (Neoliberalism “redefi nes equality as equal choice (or equal amounts 
of entrepreneurial liberty) and places any failures in that arena fi rmly with the individual. 
One’s choices are restricted by one’s own merit and by one’s prior choices, not by systemic 
or structural inequalities.”). Id. at 93.
4. See Melissa Weresh, Best Practices for Protecting Security of Position for 405(c) Faculty, 66 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 538 (2017); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2016–2017, at 29 
(2016) [hereinafter 2016–17 ABA STANDARDS]. 
5. SONJA K. FOSS, RHETORICAL CRITICISM: EXPLORATION & PRACTICE 210 (4th ed. 2009).
6. Id.
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everything else as others). Together, these structures, strategies, and language 
choices ensure that no one will mistake the faculty and courses that constitute 
the “norm” of legal education, further propping up their legitimacy.
To begin with Chapter 4, Standard 401 establishes a minimum standard for 
faculty qualifi cations: “A law school shall have a faculty whose qualifi cations 
and experience enable the law school to operate in compliance with the 
Standards and carry out its program of legal education.”7 In order to meet that 
standard, “[t]he faculty shall possess a high degree of competence, as demonstrated 
by academic qualifi cation, experience in teaching or practice, teaching eff ectiveness, and 
scholarship.”8 Consistent with the rhetorical strategy of assuming the conclusion, 
nothing more than this is necessary because ABA site team inspectors are the 
kind of experts—primarily other law school faculty members—who already 
know what everybody knows about what constitutes a competent faculty.9
When it comes to protecting job security and academic freedom, Standard 
405(a) requires law schools to “establish and maintain conditions adequate 
to attract and retain a competent faculty.”10 Standard 405(b) specifi es that a 
law school must “have an established and announced policy with respect to 
academic freedom and tenure.”11 Read together, these Standards might be 
construed to mandate a uniform policy of academic freedom and tenure for all 
of a law school’s faculty members.
But that is not the reading the Standards support. By establishing 
additional and lesser categories, the ABA lets us know that the requirement 
of an established and announced policy on academic freedom and tenure 
applies only to the category of faculty members whose membership need not 
be delineated because it is a category that everybody already knows—those who, by 
tradition, have been hired on the tenure track. By conveying the impression 
that this understanding is so widely shared that it need not be stated, the 
rhetorical choice reinforces the remarkable assumption that all other faculty 
members are so diff erent that they require at least three additional categories.12
That the resulting categories refl ect and create hierarchy is demonstrated 
fi rst by the ABA’s confi dence that everyone will understand who is entitled 
to protection of their academic freedom through tenure. Moreover, not only 
7. 2016–17 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 27.
8. Id. When italics are used within quotations from the Standards, the emphasis has been 
added.
9. For confi rmation that everybody knows the characteristics most in demand when hiring law 
school faculty members, see, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., How to Become a Law School Professor, SSRN 
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376549.
10. 2016–17 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 29.
11. Id.
12. The categories include tenure-track faculty (405(b)); clinical faculty (405(c)); legal writing 
faculty (405(d)); and short-term clinical and legal writing faculty in some circumstances 
(405(c) & Interpretation 405–9). Id. at 29–30.
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is it unnecessary to label or describe the category accorded such fundamental 
protection, it is unnecessary as well to defi ne, describe, or detail what this 
essential policy must contain. The Standards say only that there must be a 
“policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure” and that it must be 
established and announced.
Through their language, the Standards reveal and enforce consensus: The 
protections and rights bestowed on those who fall within the top level of the 
hierarchy accrue so naturally that they need not be spelled out. As we descend 
in the hierarchy, more detailed descriptions will inevitably become necessary 
in order to assure less protection. For full-time clinical faculty members, it 
is suffi  cient for law schools to provide “reasonably similar” protections and 
rights.13 For legal writing faculty, law schools need only off er the protections 
and rights that “may be necessary” to attract and retain a qualifi ed faculty 
and “safeguard academic freedom.”14 In both instances, unlike the rights and 
protections that attach automatically and without question to the top tier, the 
ABA confi rms the lesser status of the rights and protections aff orded to the 
lesser categories by describing in some detail the least that law schools must 
do.15
Linking faculty status with the privileges accorded to the courses they 
teach, the ABA Standards maintain curricular hierarchies as well. In Chapter 
3, curricular requirements are spelled out. Until the adoption of “learning 
outcomes” in 2014, the curricular requirements began with this one: “(a) A 
law school shall require that each student receive substantial instruction in: 
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to eff ective and responsible 
participation in the legal profession.”16 Mirroring the implicit message that 
norms need little explanation (and no regulation), the Standards ventured 
neither a defi nition of what constitutes “substantive” law nor a description of 
what courses are generally regarded as necessary.
Because they set the “standards for approval of law schools,” we assume 
a connection between the Standards and the goal of assuring that law 
schools provide eff ective and appropriate legal education. Moreover, because 
the Standards establish norms, they suggest a real, natural, and obvious 
connection between merit and “normal” faculty and between quality and 
“normal” courses.
Beyond this network of implied associations, Chapter 4 explicitly names 
who’s in and who’s out. Faculty at the top are referred to simply as “faculty,” 
13. Id. at 29 (Standard 405(c)).
14. Id. (Standard 405(d)).
15. Id. at 29-30 (Interpretations 405–3, 405–6, 405–7, 405–8).
16. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2013–2014, at 21 (2013). In place 
of the language cited in the text, the amended Standard 302 mandates that a law school 
establish learning outcomes that include competency in “[k]nowledge and understanding 
of substantive and procedural law.” 2016–17 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 15.
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while those who fall into the lesser categories are known either as “clinical 
faculty members” or “legal writing teachers.” (The ABA recently discarded 
even more explicitly hierarchical labels once attached to those who teach legal 
writing: “instructors” and “other teaching resources.”) As always, language 
choices matter: Labels like these make the resulting categories appear to be 
“found, not made,” preexisting and warranted, not created and perpetuated 
by the Standards themselves. 
Throughout the legislative-regulatory process that shaped the ABA 
Standards governing law schools, the authors responded from time to time to 
arguments against hierarchies and to other dissenting voices. They recognized 
fi rst clinical and then legal writing professors as deserving of protection 
for academic freedom and some form of job security. And although I have 
elsewhere concluded that the rhetorical eff ects of the detailed descriptions 
included in Standard 405(c) appear to reinforce the hierarchical nature of the 
created categories, I recognize that provisions spelling out what constitutes 
reasonably similar protections for clinical professors might in fact be used to 
assure the kind of “substantive equality” necessary to account for and protect 
genuine diff erences among diff erent kinds of faculty.17
Still, the rhetoric of Chapters 3 and 4 of the ABA Standards creates, 
maintains, and perpetuates hierarchies. Those hierarchies subordinate some 
categories of faculty members and the courses they teach. Without change 
in the Standards or their implementation, these hierarchies will remain, and 
the values and norms of traditionally privileged faculty and subject matters 
will become even more fi rmly embedded as representing the best of the 
legal academy. By adopting the 405(c) “best practices” policy statement,18 
individual law schools and law faculties take upon themselves the power to 
demonstrate that the ABA Standards are the fl oor, not the ceiling, and that 
legal education’s essential values and norms include robust protection of job 
security and academic freedom for all law professors.
17. Linda L. Berger, When Less is More: An Ideological Rhetorical Analysis of Selected ABA Standards on 
Curricula and Faculty, in THE DOCTRINE/SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED 
WOUND (Linda H. Edwards ed., forthcoming August 2017).
18. Weresh, supra note 4.
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